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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Solving  the  problem  of  consciousness  remains  one  of the  biggest  challenges  in  modern  science.  One  key
step  towards  understanding  consciousness  is to  empirically  narrow  down  neural  processes  associated
with  the subjective  experience  of  a particular  content.  To  unravel  these  neural  correlates  of  conscious-
ness  (NCC)  a  common  scientiﬁc  strategy  is  to compare  perceptual  conditions  in  which  consciousness  of
a  particular  content  is  present  with  those  in which  it is  absent,  and  to  determine  differences  in measures
of  brain  activity  (the so  called  “contrastive  analysis”).  However,  this  comparison  appears  not  to revealonscious  perception
ontrastive analysis
exclusively  the  NCC,  as the  NCC  proper  can  be confounded  with  prerequisites  for and  consequences  of
conscious  processing  of  the  particular  content.  This  implies  that previous  results  cannot  be unequivo-
cally  interpreted  as reﬂecting  the  neural  correlates  of conscious  experience.  Here  we  review  evidence
supporting  this  conjecture  and  suggest  experimental  strategies  to untangle  the  NCC  from  the  prereq-
uisites  and  consequences  of  conscious  experience  in order  to further  develop  the  otherwise  valid  and
valuable  contrastive  methodology.
© 2011  Elsevier  Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ontents
1. Introduction  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  . .  .  .  . . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . 738
1.1. Contrastive  analysis  as  the  key methodological  strategy  in  consciousness  research  . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . . .  .  .  . .  . . 738
2.  The  3 NCCs. . . .  . .  .  . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  .  .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . 738
2.1. NCC  for  processes  directly  corresponding  to  conscious  experience  .  . . . . . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . . .  . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  . . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  .  .  . . .  . 738
2.2.  Prerequisite  processes  carrying  no actual  conscious  contents  (NCC-pr)  . .  . . . . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . .  . .  .  .  .  . .  . . .  738
2.3.  Consequences  following  actual  conscious  experience  (NCC-co).  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . 739
2.4.  The  3 NCCs:  conclusions  .  . .  .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  . .  .  . .  . .  .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  .  . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . .  .  739
3. Distilling  consciousness:  disentangling  the NCCs  . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  . 740
3.1. Disentangling  NCC-pr  from  NCC  . .  .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  . . . .  . .  .  . 741
3.2. Disentangling  NCC-co  from  NCC  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . .  . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . . . .  742
4. The  3  NCCs  and  previous  results  .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  . . . . . .  . .  . 742
4.1. The  3 NCCs  and  the  temporal  course  of conscious  perception.  .  . . .  .  . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  .  . .  742
4.2.  The  3 NCCs  and  the  activity  of  different  brain  areas  . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  .  . .  7435. Conclusions  .  . . .  . . . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  .  . .
Acknowledgments . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  .  . .  . 
References . .  .  . . . . . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . .
∗ Corresponding authors at: Max  Planck Institute for Brain Research, Department of Ne
el.:  +49 69 96769 268; fax: +49 69 96769 327.
E-mail addresses: jaan.aru@gmail.com (J. Aru), lucia.melloni@brain.mpg.de(L.  Melloni)
149-7634© 2011 Elsevier Ltd.   
oi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.003
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. . . . .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  744
. . .  . .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . .  .  745
 . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  .  . .  . 745
urophysiology, Deutschordenstrasse 46, 60528 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
.
7 behav
1
1
c
o
p
t
o
e
s
t
s
n
t
i
c
t
h
p
t
T
(
(
m
i
2
o
a
c
c
a
i
d
i
a
2
(
r
o
w
b
p
p
r
2
g
m
d
s
a
o
c
c
2
p
a
c
a
c
w38 J. Aru et al. / Neuroscience and Bio
. Introduction
.1. Contrastive analysis as the key methodological strategy in
onsciousness  research
The  problem of consciousness could be approached scientiﬁcally
nly after concrete research strategies were suggested and research
roblems were deﬁned (Baars, 1989; Crick and Koch, 1990). Since
hen, an important research goal has been to ﬁnd the minimal set
f neural processes that are together sufﬁcient for the conscious
xperience of a particular content – the neural correlates of con-
ciousness (NCC). This purpose is complementary to the research
radition about general states of awareness (e.g., awake, NREM
leep, vegetative state) where consciousness and lack of conscious-
ess are contrasted (Koch, 2004; Laureys and Tononi, 2010). In
his paper we deal with the former aspect where NCC are stud-
ed in relation to the content of perception as opposed to treating
onsciousness as a state variable.
When investigating the neural correlates that underlie the con-
ent of our consciousness a common and widely accepted strategy
as been to hold the stimulus conditions similar while conscious
erception varies as the dependent measure – on some trials
he subject perceives the target consciously, on other trials not.
his experimental approach, known as the contrastive analysis
Baars, 1989), is implemented in various experimental paradigms
Bachmann et al., 2011; Kim and Blake, 2005) and combined with
easures of neural activity has brought about important insights
nto the NCC (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koivisto and Revonsuo,
010; Rees, 2007; Tononi and Koch, 2008). The asserted advantage
f the contrastive analysis is the following: by comparing conscious
nd non-conscious perception, the NCC can be unraveled without
onfounding it with unconscious processes involved in target per-
eption that take place in both conditions. However, despite the
pparently straightforward logic of this approach the results are
nconclusive and contradictory. For instance, some studies report
ifferences between conscious and non-conscious conditions start-
ng already at stimulus onset or around 100 ms  post-stimulus (Aru
nd Bachmann, 2009a,b; Melloni et al., 2007; Pins and Ffytche,
003), others have only found differences in later phases (>300 ms)
Del Cul et al., 2007; Gaillard et al., 2009). These contradictory
esults can be understood when considering a severe method-
logical pitfall: the result of the contrast between trials with and
ithout conscious perception of a target is not only the NCC proper
ut could also reﬂect processes that in a particular experiment
aradigm, regularly and lawfully, precede and/or follow conscious
erception without directly corresponding to the subjective expe-
ience (Bachmann, 2009; de Graaf et al., 2012; Melloni and Singer,
010). These processes need to be distinguished and disentan-
led from each other before we can understand the crucial neural
echanisms underlying conscious experience. Fig. 1 illustrates the
evelopment of enthusiastic proposals as well as critical ideas in the
cience of consciousness. The recent criticism on the contrastive
nalysis is expected to pave the way for further positive devel-
pments and experimental paradigms that will eventually lead us
loser to unraveling the neural processes directly associated with
onscious experience.
.  The 3 NCCs
In  what follows we recapitulate the two new types of NCCs pro-
osed previously (Bachmann, 2009; de Graaf et al., 2012; Melloni
nd Singer, 2010): the prerequisites for and the consequences of
onscious perception, in short NCC-pr and NCC-co, respectively. We
lso highlight arguments that support the existence of these pro-
esses confounding the search for the NCC. For the sake of clarity
e start with the existing deﬁnition of the NCC.ioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746
2.1. NCC for processes directly corresponding to conscious
experience
NCC is a neural process that directly corresponds to the phe-
nomenal experience of the target. NCC is the “minimal set of neural
events jointly sufﬁcient for a speciﬁc conscious experience (given
the appropriate enabling conditions)” (Koch, 2004). In other words,
if we  would stimulate or generate these neural events, a particular
conscious experience would happen. Therefore, NCC is the process
we need to study in order to understand how conscious experience
of a particular content is related to the neuronal processes of the
brain. Previously, it has been thought that the contrastive analy-
sis, as commonly used, directly reveals the NCC (Fig. 2a). Recently,
however it has been argued that the result of the contrast between
trials with and without conscious perception can also be processes
that precede or follow conscious perception (Fig. 2b).
2.2.  Prerequisite processes carrying no actual conscious contents
(NCC-pr)
These  processes are different in the conditions 〈target in
consciousness〉 vs. 〈target not in consciousness〉 and participate
in determining in the particular experimental setup if the target
appears in consciousness, but are not part of the NCC (Bachmann,
2009; de Graaf et al., 2012). There are many different processes that
can act as NCC-prs. Hence, one particular NCC-pr need not be suf-
ﬁcient or even necessary for generating a conscious experience of
the target, but some kind of NCC-pr might be necessary to bring
about the very processes of NCC.
In a paradigm with transient stimulation an example of NCC-pr
(Fig. 3a and b) is the stochastic ﬂuctuations in the excitability of
neurons. For long, it has been recognized that the ability to per-
ceive a weak signal ﬂuctuates over time – an effect that has been
exploited by the contrastive method to create conscious vs. non-
conscious conditions. However, only recently it was  shown that
ﬂuctuations of ongoing brain activity, as indexed by the phase of
pre-stimulus oscillations, systematically determine these behav-
ioral dynamics (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson et al., 2009; Monto
et al., 2008). The phase of ongoing alpha (10 Hz) oscillations also
determines the effectiveness with which a single TMS  pulse elicited
a phosphene: with a 15% increase in the likelihood of a percep-
tual outcome (phosphene) between opposite phases (Dugue et al.,
2011). This effect was observed over an extended time period
(∼400 ms), showing that processes correlating with conscious per-
ception of the target clearly precede the experience itself. As all
this takes place in the pre-stimulus interval (being it either before
stimulus presentation or TMS  pulse application), where no con-
scious experience of the actual target could have emerged, it
constitutes a NCC-pr. Other studies relating pre-stimulus activity
to subjective reports show that NCC-pr can reﬂect spontaneous
excitability as also indexed by oscillatory power (Ergenoglu et al.,
2004; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2004; Romei et al., 2008; van
Dijk et al., 2008) and that the NCC-pr can be linked to attention
(Thut et al., 2006; Worden et al., 2000; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry,
2009), decision bias (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009) and poten-
tially other processes.
In  the experimental paradigms with sustained epochs of percep-
tion (Fig. 3c), NCC-prs can manifest themselves in various ways.
For example, for binocular rivalry it was proposed more than a
century ago and shown recently (Alais et al., 2010) that adapta-
tion leading to weakening of reciprocal inhibition determines the
alternations between competing stimuli. More precisely, neurons
coding for the dominant stimulus adapt over time, which in turn
weakens the inhibition of the suppressed stimulus, increasing its
neuronal responses and thus bringing that stimulus into conscious-
ness. Importantly, (reciprocal) inhibition could be seen as NCC-pr,
J. Aru et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746 739
Fig. 1. A time-line of the major events in the science of consciousness. The time-line illustrates that fresh optimistic theoretical and empirical insights are always followed
by critical evaluation of these ideas and results. Therefore, the recognition of the problem regarding the prerequisites for and consequences of NCC is a logical corollary of
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che  popularity of the contrastive method in the science of consciousness. The ackno
he  prerequisites for and consequences of conscious perception from the processe
ubjective and we  apologize to all the co-researchers who  feel that their work has b
s it contributes to which target will be consciously perceived and
s different between the two contrastive conditions (a particular
arget in consciousness vs. not in consciousness). However, it is not
art of the neural processes sufﬁcient for generating or maintaining
onscious experience of that target.
.3. Consequences following actual conscious experience
NCC-co)
These processes appear as after-effects when NCC is or just has
een present, but are not a part of the minimally sufﬁcient mech-
nisms of the conscious experience of the target. These processes
re the consequences of conscious perception (de Graaf et al., 2012;
elloni and Singer, 2010). The existence of such processes is a logi-
al consequence of assigning any function to conscious perception –
f  conscious perception enables certain processes that unconscious
erception does not, these processes would inevitably appear in
he contrast between trials with and without conscious perception,
ven if they are solely the consequences and not the direct corre-
ates of consciousness. Importantly, most theories of consciousness
o confer a function to consciousness in the chain of informa-
ion processing (Seth, 2009), for instance sustained maintenance
f information, access to long-term memory, novel combinations
f operations, and intentional behavior.
For example, it is known that neurons in the medial temporal
obe (MTL) respond in all-or-none fashion, closely following the
ubjective report of the patient (Quiroga et al., 2008). The ﬁdelity
ith which MTL  neurons follow the subjective visibility of the stim-
li is so high that conscious versus non-conscious trials can be
istinguished solely based on the neurons’ ﬁring rate: either the
euron responds when the subject reports to have consciously rec-
gnized the picture, or stay completely silent when the image did
ot reach consciousness. However, damage to the MTL-system (or
ven its complete resection) does not affect moment-to-moment
onscious  perception (Crick and Koch, 1990; Postle, 2009), but
nly the formation of a memory trace. That is, subjects will con-
inue to have subjective experience but will have no memory of it.
herefore, such all-or-none responses in MTL, even though closely
ollowing the subject’s report, do not correspond to the NCC but are
nstead part of the NCC-co reﬂecting processes related to memory
onsolidation.ement of the problem should be followed by clever experiments trying to separate
reﬂect NCC directly. (The selection of the events for the time-line was necessarily
eglected.)
In addition, NCC-co processes can also reﬂect differences in
performance. Usually, conditions in which subjects are conscious
of the stimuli correlate with higher performance (for instance
higher detectability or discriminability) than when subjects are
not conscious of the stimuli. Thus, it has been claimed that a part
of the brain activity observed using the contrast between con-
scious and non-conscious perception pertains to differences in
performance instead of conscious experience (Lau, 2008). Direct
evidence for this claim comes from a recent neuroimaging study
(Lau and Passingham, 2006) reporting that when performance was
equalized between conditions, so that only subjective experience
varied, only dorsolateral prefrontal cortex distinguished conscious
from unconscious conditions as opposed to the extensive fronto-
parietal network typically reported in previous studies (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001). Recent studies in which performance was
assessed alongside with subjective experience further conﬁrm that
these two processes can indeed dissociate in time, space and,
importantly, in neural locus (Hesselmann et al., 2011; Lamy et al.,
2009; Schwiedrzik et al., 2011). This highlights that performance
and subjective experience are not interchangeable and that to
investigate NCC proper, performance has to be controlled for.
2.4.  The 3 NCCs: conclusions
Thus,  despite the principal methodological importance of the
contrastive analysis, the method, as commonly used, seems to
lack the required speciﬁcity to unravel the neuronal processes
exclusively related to the subjective experience. In fact, simply con-
trasting conscious to non-conscious conditions could also reﬂect
processes preceding or following the NCC. The problem exists
in all experimental paradigms currently used to investigate con-
sciousness (Fig. 3), regardless of whether differences in conscious
perception result from internal switches in brain states, such as
in binocular rivalry, or from external manipulations of visibility,
as for example achieved by varying the SOA in masking experi-
ments. It is conceivable that the distinction between the 3 NCCs
also applies to studies in which different states of consciousness
are contrasted (e.g. deep sleep vs. waking or vegetative state vs.
minimally conscious states), as these conditions do not exclusively
differ in the consciousness state (which is the intended manipu-
lation), but could also do so in their prerequisite processes and
740 J. Aru et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746
Fig. 2. Neural processes revealed by the contrastive analysis. In the contrastive analysis, a stimulus (here a blue “splash”) is presented so that it sometimes appears in
conscious experience and sometimes not. On each trial the subject gives a response indicating whether the stimulus was consciously perceived or not. Neural processes
are sorted according to the subjective responses to “aware” and “unaware” conditions, which are compared to each other. What neural processes can be the outcome of
this  contrast? (a) The traditional view on contrastive analysis assumes that the only difference between these conditions is the subjective experience of the stimulus. Thus,
the  contrastive analysis appears suitable to reveal the neural correlates of subjective experience (NCC). (b) The proposed interpretation of contrastive analysis. According
to  this view the outcome of contrastive analysis consists besides the NCC of two  other processes – NCC-pr and NCC-co. NCC-pr corresponds to unconscious processes
that though related to conscious perception of a stimulus (e.g., attention that enhances weak information to cross the threshold of consciousness) appear before any
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cubjective experience emerges. NCC-co represents the consequences of consciously
nalysis by itself cannot exclusively reveal the NCC because it confounds NCC with
timulus.
specially in the consequences (in the conscious state people think,
ccess long-term memory, have intentions etc.). It will be neces-
ary to determine if and how much the 3 NCC problem applies
o other areas of research where conscious experience is investi-
ated (e.g. studies of conscious intentions, introspection, imagery,
reams, inner speech etc.).
This  conjecture implies that previous results based on the con-
rast between trials with and without conscious perception of a
articular content cannot be unequivocally interpreted as reﬂect-
ng the NCC, as they could also represent other processes. Given that
he majority of studies investigating consciousness have used such
ontrasts (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koivisto and Revonsuo,
010; Rees, 2007; Rees et al., 2002; Tononi and Koch, 2008) such
einterpretation might have a major impact on consciousness
esearch and on current theories on the neural mechanisms of con-
ciousness. As long as the NCC proper cannot be clearly dissociated
rom these other processes, we should be cautious when relating
ny experimental ﬁnding about neural processes correlating with
onscious experience to the NCC. Therefore, if we want to proceediving the stimulus. Consequently, if this view is correct, the traditional contrastive
 other processes that do not directly correspond to the conscious experience of the
in  understanding consciousness, the NCC has to be experimen-
tally distilled from the prerequisites for and the consequences of
conscious perception. As mentioned above, the problem of 3 NCCs
may also apply to other areas in the study of conscious experience
besides the investigation of conscious perception. Here we  focus
on the latter as it constitutes the best studied aspect of conscious
experience. However, it might prove fruitful to apply the concept
of 3 NCCs also to these other aspects of conscious experience as
alternative solutions to disentangle the 3 NCC conundrum might
emerge from that research.
3.  Distilling consciousness: disentangling the NCCs
There  is probably no single experiment with today’s research
techniques that would yield a clear separation between NCC and
NCC-pr or NCC and NCC-co. As discussed above, the contrast
between trials with and without conscious perception of a particu-
lar content does not dissociate these processes. In what follows,
we propose research strategies to separate the NCC from the
J. Aru et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746 741
Fig. 3. Possible temporal relationships between NCC, NCC-pr and NCC-co in various experimental situations. (a) If a single transient stimulus is presented, NCC-pr, NCC and
NCC-co  are evoked. Areas with dotted outlines indicate that the temporal differences and overlap between the 3 NCCs is currently unknown. This scenario corresponds to
experimental paradigms like threshold stimulation. (b) If two (or more) transient stimuli are presented sequentially, the different NCCs of these different stimuli can be
overlapping in time. This scenario corresponds to experimental paradigms like masking or attentional blink. (c) In experimental situations with longer epochs of perception,
each epoch can be understood as a succession of the transient events (as in a), where the NCC of time point t can overlap with NCC-co from time point t − 1 and NCC-pr
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srom time point t + 1. This scenario corresponds to experimental paradigms like bin
rocesses unfolding within pre-conscious and conscious stages of percept formatio
CC-prs and NCC-cos (see also de Graaf et al., 2012; Melloni and
inger, 2010). Success in understanding the neuronal processes
irectly underlying conscious experience rests upon distinguishing
nd disentangling its confounds.
.1.  Disentangling NCC-pr from NCC
There is no question that processes differentiating conscious
rom non-conscious stimuli already before stimuli onset corre-
pond to NCC-pr. Beyond that, difﬁculties begin. As NCC-pr can
otentially appear after stimulus onset but also concurrently with
CC, there is no simple time criterion that separates NCC-pr from
CC. Furthermore, an interesting theoretical but also empirically
hallenging problem arises when considering that the NCC-pr do
ot only have to appear before the NCC but can also stay active
uring the NCC (Fig. 3). If NCC-pr is there only to “ignite” NCC by pre-
eding it, the empirical study and measurement of NCC is tractable
ecause later epochs of target experience in long-duration target
timuli are not confounded with NCC-pr. However, we currently
ack the required knowledge about the NCC-prs to make any claims
bout their duration or temporal structure.
The most straightforward way to disentangle NCC-pr from NCC
s to directly manipulate the NCC-pr processes, and compare the
eural signatures that are common to all of them. We  assume that
ifferent NCC-pr would elicit distinct neural activities, while neu-
al process directly involved in consciousness would be invariantly
resent in all conditions. As an example, consider a “consciousness
ask” in which a stimulus under identical stimulation conditions
e.g., a masking experiment with invariant masks and SOAs) is
ometimes consciously perceived and sometimes not. As discussedr rivalry or motion induced blindness. Similar ideas on the temporal overlap of the
 been also proposed previously (Brown, 1988).
above,  this approach would lead to the problem of 3 NCCs. However,
now, in an additional step, in the same experimental setup with the
same stimuli, we  could vary potential NCC-prs such as for instance
stimulus expectation, adaptation, working memory or allocation
of attention independently. Speciﬁcally, in one condition stimuli
could be brought to consciousness through expectation (Melloni
et al., 2011) and in another through attention (Wyart and Tallon-
Baudry, 2008). Which neural processes resulting from the contrast
〈consciously perceived〉 vs. 〈not consciously perceived〉 are similar
and which ones are different in these two conditions? Neural signa-
tures that differ between conditions should belong to the NCC-pr;
neural signatures common to both comparisons are likely to be
related to the NCC. Using such an approach, it was recently shown
that short-latency event-related potentials previously related to
conscious perception (Pins and Ffytche, 2003) most likely repre-
sent signatures of the NCC-pr (Melloni et al., 2011) as opposed to
NCC. Contrasting attention with expectations might be particularly
revealing, as these processes are proposed to have opposite effects
on neural activity – attention increases sensory responses whereas
expectation decreases them (Summerﬁeld and Egner, 2009). Thus,
neural processes that increase with attention but decrease with
expectation under similar subjective experience and objective per-
formance are unlikely to reﬂect the NCC proper.
In addition to cognitive factors, one could affect NCC-pr in a simi-
lar vein with TMS. In a recent experiment it was observed that when
the visual cortex was stimulated 100–120 ms after a near-threshold
visual stimulus with TMS  intensity below the phosphene threshold,
the thresholds for explicit perception of the visual stimulus were
decreased (Abrahamyan et al., 2011). In line with the experimen-
tal strategies proposed above, one could combine this TMS-related
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mprovement of perception with an independent cognitive manip-
lation (e.g. of attention or expectation) that also has a beneﬁcial
ffect on perception and measure the neural correlates of conscious
erception with the same logic as presented previously: only neu-
al signatures related to perceptual enhancement common to both
anipulations are likely to be related to the NCC.
.2. Disentangling NCC-co from NCC
As with NCC-pr, one cannot straightforwardly rely on a strict
emporal distinction between NCC and NCC-co. Probably correlates
hat appear 2 s after the onset of a 30 ms  stimulus indeed represent
CC-co, however, the critical question refers to neural correlates
ppearing earlier than 500 ms  post-stimulus as the bulk of stud-
es have related those to NCC (Del Cul et al., 2007; Fisch et al.,
009; Gaillard et al., 2009; Koivisto et al., 2008; Melloni et al., 2011;
ergent et al., 2005). Neurons in the MTL  have a latency of about
00 ms  MTL  (Quiroga et al., 2008). If we are right in stating that the
ctivity of MTL  neurons, even when apparently closely following
he subjective report, is not the NCC but constitutes the NCC-co, it
ecomes evident that the NCC-co can be present already in a time
indow that is often investigated for the NCC.
According to the deﬁnition, the NCC-co corresponds to the after-
ffects of conscious perception. Thus, it is logically possible to
bserve NCC even when NCC-co is not elicited. In the normal brain
uch a dissociation might not occur very often; however, lesion
tudies might be revealing: if an area can be lesioned or removed
ithout any effect on conscious perception, then activation of this
rea can be regarded as NCC-co. This approach allowed, for instance,
uling out activity in MTL  as a direct NCC (Crick and Koch, 1990;
ostle, 2009). Importantly, the tests applied to identify NCC-cos
ave to be sensitive enough to capture subtle effects on conscious
erception. For instance, although the view that prefrontal cortex
PFC) is causally relevant for conscious perception (Dehaene and
hangeux, 2011) could at ﬁrst have been rejected based on lesion
tudies (Pollen, 1999), it has gained support from carefully con-
ucted studies exploiting the masking paradigm in patients with
FC lesions (Del Cul et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the fact that the psy-
hophysical threshold for conscious access is elevated in patients
ith PFC lesions cannot be taken as direct evidence of PFC having
 central role in conscious perception. Instead, PFC could provide
op-down support for either strengthening or maintaining the (cog-
itive results of the) conscious percept (Gazzaley et al., 2007; Miller
t al., 2011). This is a likely possibility as patients could perform the
ifﬁcult masking task relatively well and were reporting conscious
erception despite their PFC lesion.
Lesion studies can be complemented with interventional tech-
iques in healthy subjects, such as TMS  (see also de Graaf et al.,
012) and/or transcranial direct or alternating current stimulation
tDCS or tACS). This approach offers several advantages over lesion
tudies. First, it allows for comparisons within the same individ-
al, as TMS  can be applied in an on–off manner. Second, due to
he transient nature of the intervention, profound reorganization
f brain networks is not to be expected. This allows dissociating
ffects related to lesioning a particular area from alterations at the
evel of the network resulting from compensatory plasticity. Third,
irtual lesions can be made with a precision not comparable even
hen performing probabilistic lesion mapping studies in patients.
urthermore, virtual lesions can be made not only of a single region,
ut also in several regions at the same or at varying times. Com-
ined with neuroimaging, one could ﬁrst ﬁnd a neural signature X
hat correlates with conscious perception in the contrastive analy-
is (e.g. the activity in the frontal cortex) and then in a second step
est whether perturbation of this signature X (e.g. by TMS) has an
ffect on conscious perception. If such perturbation produces no
ffects on conscious perception, the respective process or area is aioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746
prime candidate for NCC-co. However, to ﬁrmly conclude that, evi-
dence has to be provided that such manipulation has a behavioral
effect. Otherwise, it is unclear whether the effect was not observed
because the perturbation is simply ineffective, or it speciﬁcally
does not affect conscious perception. The feasibility of such selec-
tive manipulation has been recently shown: theta-burst TMS  to
bilateral dorsolateral PFC interfered with metacognitive aspects of
visual awareness but not with discrimination performance (Rounis
et al., 2010).
Besides interventional approaches, much progress could be
made by (i) obtaining comprehensive data on the sequence
of cognitive events distinguishing conscious from unconscious
processing, assuming that causes precede effects, and by (ii) consid-
ering theoretical approaches which clearly disclose some cognitive
processes (e.g. working memory) as dependent on conscious per-
ception (Baars, 1989). This is particularly relevant as it allows for
contrasts in which not only consciousness is manipulated (e.g.,
aware vs. unaware trials) but also its consequences (e.g., condi-
tions in which encoding in working memory is present or absent).
Following such an approach, it was recently shown that late electri-
cal signatures of consciousness, in particular the P3 event-related
potential typically associated with conscious access (Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011), does not follow conscious perception when sub-
jects already have a conscious working memory representation of
the target stimulus (Melloni et al., 2011). This result points to the
tantalizing possibility that late waves of EEG activity such as the P3
might reﬂect NCC-cos, and not the NCC itself.
4. The 3 NCCs and previous results
In light of the ideas proposed here, an important question is
whether previous ﬁndings reﬂect NCC or rather NCC-pr, NCC-co
or even a compound of these different processes. Since little is
known about the NCC-pr and NCC-co and how they interact with
the NCC proper, it is currently not straightforward to determine
which results indeed relate to NCC and which ones do not. A ﬁrst
step is to identify and recognize the neuronal signatures of pro-
cesses that might not reﬂect the NCC.
Importantly, many current theories of consciousness are
founded on empirical ﬁndings, assuming that these genuinely
reﬂect the NCC. As shown, this assumption might not hold true.
Thus, it is possible that some theories about the NCC are actually
based on NCC-prs or NCC-cos. Clarifying this issue will hopefully
lead to better agreement among theories of consciousness. Note
that we do not suggest that all previous ﬁndings are necessarily
wrong or doubtable, nor do we claim that all theories are based on
the wrong assumptions about the previous results; we simply point
to the worrisome possibility that follows the theoretical distinction
between the 3 NCCs. In the next paragraphs we link this theoretical
problem to existing results from the contrastive analysis with the
hope that the recognition of the 3 NCC problem will contribute con-
structively to the disputes about the timing and neuroanatomical
locus of conscious perception.
4.1.  The 3 NCCs and the temporal course of conscious perception
The  distinction between the three NCCs could prove valuable
to resolve some controversies regarding the question whether
conscious perception happens early (Aru and Bachmann, 2009b;
Melloni et al., 2007; Pins and Ffytche, 2003) or late (Del Cul
et al., 2007; Gaillard et al., 2009; Sergent et al., 2005), as some of
the studies observing early correlates might reﬂect NCC-pr while
those reporting late correlates might reﬂect NCC-co. In a recent
study, such an approach was purposely followed: the processes
related to NCC-pr and NCC-co were manipulated in an attempt
J. Aru et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746 743
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Fig. 4. Neural signatures of conscious perception: NCC-pr, NCC and NCC-co. In the study of Melloni et al. (2011), both the pre-requisites and the after-effects of conscious
perception were manipulated. Subjects had to rate the visibility of a stimulus embedded in noise. Visibility could either arise because of the strength of sensory evidence (left
panel)  or because of the presence of perceptual expectations (right panel). In these conditions, the prerequisites (NCC-pr) differed, but conscious perception was identical.
Furthermore, a conscious working memory representation of the target could already be present (left panel) or absent (right panel). Here, conscious perception was again
equalized, but the consequences (NCC-co) differed, since in the latter case, a new representation needed to be encoded in working memory. The red bars indicate the
periods of signiﬁcant difference between the aware and unaware trials. The only component differentiating consciously perceived from not consciously perceived trials
independently of differences in NCC-pr or NCC-co was a mid  latency component, likely reﬂecting neuronal processes directly involved in the NCC. In contrast, early processes
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wifferentiating seen from unseen stimuli were not present when consciousness re
he  late ERP component was only present when a working memory representation 
hen either the prerequisites or consequences of consciousness were manipulated
o more directly address neuronal processes related to the NCC
tself (Melloni et al., 2011). To investigate NCC-prs, Melloni et al.
2011) examined how sensory evidence and top-down expec-
ations, respectively, inﬂuence the threshold of awareness, and
hether the two factors modulate brain activity differently. This
llowed contrasting brain states with and without expectations and
ith perceived and non-perceived stimuli for identical stimulation
onditions. To investigate NCC-cos, conditions based on whether
he target was or was not present in working memory were com-
ared. As in previous studies (Mathewson et al., 2009; Pins and
fytche, 2003) it appeared that in the absence of expectations an
arly event-related potential (ERP), already present around 100 ms
n occipital sensors, distinguished conscious from unconscious tri-
ls (Fig. 4). Perception under those circumstances is known to
epend on bottom-up stimulation (the amount of sensory evi-
ence) and stochastic ﬂuctuations in the prestimulus period which
ointly determine whether a target will or will not be consciously
erceived (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson et al., 2009). However, in
he presence of expectations, that is, when perception depends not
nly on bottom-up information but also on top-down expectations,
his early component was not different between the consciously
erceived and not perceived targets. As both conditions resulted in
imilar rates of visibility, this ﬁnding suggests that early processes
ifferentiating seen from unseen stimuli – previously interpreted
s a NCC – were actually not directly related to subjective expe-
ience, but reﬂect differences in NCC-pr (Fig. 4). Along the same
ines, a late ERP (P300) distinguishing consciously perceived from
ot consciously perceived trials was only observed in trials where
he target had to be encoded in working memory but not when
ubjects already had a conscious working memory representation
f the target. This suggests that late effects like the P300 can index
rocesses related to the NCC-co instead of the NCC proper under
ertain conditions (Fig. 4). At threshold, the component most con-
istently related to conscious perception was the P200, arising at
bout 200 ms  over occipitoparietal sensors. This study also revealed
hat the electrophysiological signatures of conscious perception are
ot bound to processes with a strict latency, but depend on how
onsciousness comes about: earlier electrophysiological signatures
ere observed in the presence of top-down expectations (P200) from an interaction between sensory evidence and top-down expectations. Also,
 be established. The fact that some neural signatures of consciousness disappeared
ions the general involvement of these processes in conscious perception.
than  in their absence (P300). This further complicates the search of
the NCC, as they might change in time depending on which NCC-pr
determines perception.
Converging evidence for the proposed temporal relationships
between NCC-pr, NCC and NCC-co comes from studies with inter-
mittent binocular rivalry. In this paradigm, epochs of binocular
rivalry stimulation alternate with blank intervals, which allows to
study neural processes locked to the stimulus onset and to delin-
eate the sequence of neural events related to bistable perception.
Interestingly, Pitts and Britz (2011) when reviewing recent studies
employing such methodology come to similar three time windows
related to conscious perception as we did based on a different
experimental paradigm described above (Melloni et al., 2011): (1)
early processes around 130–160 ms  after stimulus onset that vary
with conscious perception but probably constitute a preconscious
state (in the current terms the NCC-pr), as although this component
varies with the subjective percept (Pitts et al., 2010), the stable per-
ceptual representation of the target has not emerged yet (Pitts and
Britz, 2011), (2) the “reversal negativity” around 200–300 ms  that
is a “primary candidate for a neural correlate of awareness” (Pitts
and Britz, 2011), as there the stable representation has been estab-
lished and (3) the late positive complex around 400–600 ms  that
might reﬂect further processing of the perceptual information or
processes related to working-memory maintenance (NCC-co in the
current terms).
4.2.  The 3 NCCs and the activity of different brain areas
Regarding the neural locus of consciousness it is also debated
whether conscious perception is associated with activity in sen-
sory areas (Hesselmann et al., 2011; Lamme, 2006; Zeki, 2001)
or whether higher non-sensory areas are directly involved in
conscious perception (Dehaene et al., 2006; Lau and Rosenthal,
2011). In this context, several previous studies are directly rel-
evant for understanding whether particular brain areas such as
the prefrontal cortex serve a crucial role in conscious percep-
tion, as proposed in some theories (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Lau, 2008), or whether they reﬂect other cognitive processes,
such as top-down control, report, or performance on a task. The
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vailable evidence relating PFC activity with consciousness has
een obtained by contrasting conscious vs. non-conscious trials
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). The key message of our proposal
s that by solely relying on the contrast between trials with and
ithout conscious perception of a particular content it is undeter-
ined whether such activation indeed constitutes an NCC or rather
 consequence of conscious perception (NCC-co). In line with this
onjecture, when subjects do not need to report the stimuli, dif-
erential activity between conscious and non-conscious stimuli is
ot observed in the prefrontal cortex but only in occipital visual
reas downstream of V1/V2 (Tse et al., 2005). In addition, activ-
ty in prefrontal cortex is suppressed when subjects are engaged
n a demanding perceptual categorization task, although they are
resumably fully conscious of their rapidly changing visual or audi-
ory world during that time (Goldberg et al., 2006). Finally, although
MS over frontal cortex affected voluntary control of bistable per-
eption, TMS  had no inﬂuence on passive bistable perception (de
raaf et al., 2011), which conforms nicely with the approach pro-
osed in Section 3.2: TMS  had a measurable effect on one process
voluntary control) but not on conscious perception. These results
irectly support the thesis that prefrontal activity might not be a
art of the NCC but could rather represent processes that follow
onscious perception as consequences.
In another relevant study, Eriksson and colleagues (Eriksson
t al., 2008) found that prefrontal activity and coupling between
refrontal and occipital areas decreased after training in an iden-
iﬁcation task. This result might imply that at least part of
he prefrontal activity observed in contrastive analysis could be
ttributable to the fact that in such paradigms, conscious recog-
ition is often made difﬁcult (e.g. by masking or by lowering the
ontrast of the stimuli) and PFC might be recruited to aid the recog-
ition process under poor sensory evidence (Eriksson et al., 2008).
rom this perspective PFC activity could constitute a NCC-pr, as
refrontal activity would determine whether the target reaches
onsciousness or not. This idea agrees with theories and empirical
vidence suggesting that short-latency prefrontal activity facili-
ates perception (Bar, 2003; Bar et al., 2006). Alternatively, it could
e argued that PFC activity represents NCC-co (instead or in addi-
ion to the NCC-pr) that change as a function of perceptual training.
n particular, extensive experience with the stimulus could lead to
stablished memory representations such that there is no need to
reate working memory representations on each trial, leading to
ecreased prefrontal activity with training.
All these results challenge the notion that prefrontal cortex is
irectly involved in visual awareness but suggest instead that it
ould reﬂect executive functions, top-down facilitation and/or top-
own control under conditions of increased effort. As a number
f theories of consciousness (Crick and Koch, 2003; Dehaene and
hangeux, 2011; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Lau, 2008) assert
hat activation of prefrontal cortex is part of the NCC, it is clear that
he question whether PFC activity is indeed a NCC or rather a NCC-
r or NCC-co is central for further research on the neural correlates
f consciousness.
Similar caveats hold true for the involvement of parietal cor-
ex in consciousness. In fact, when using the contrastive method
n visual versus auditory tasks, it was found that activity in pari-
tal cortex is correlated with visual but not with auditory conscious
erception (Eriksson et al., 2007), questioning its general, modality-
ndependent role in conscious perception. Even further, it is known
rom the neurological literature that bilateral lesions of the pari-
tal cortex do not abolish conscious perception: although patients
xhibiting such lesions are only able to perceive one object at a time
simultagnosia), this one object is nevertheless consciously experi-
nced (Friedman-Hill et al., 1995; Robertson, 2003). These results
uggest that the activity of the parietal cortex might not be a part of
he NCC. As substantial empirical evidence links the activity of theioral Reviews 36 (2012) 737–746
parietal cortex to perceptual alternations in paradigms with mul-
tistable perception (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Lumer et al., 1998),
it is likely that the processes in the parietal cortex constitute an
essential prerequisite for NCC. This claim is substantiated by recent
evidence that TMS  to parietal cortex affects the dominance dura-
tions during binocular rivalry (Carmel et al., 2010; Zaretskaya et al.,
2010) and that the structure of the parietal cortex is correlated with
the intraindividual differences in the perceptual alternation rate of
a bistable stimulus (Kanai et al., 2010).
Finally, there is a long-standing controversy about the role of
primary visual cortex (V1) in conscious perception. Even if V1
lesions lead to loss of awareness in the corresponding parts of the
visual ﬁeld, it constitutes no strong argument for the NCC being
in V1, as V1 lesions also disrupt information ﬂow to higher order
visual areas. Empirical and theoretical arguments in the mid-1990s
suggested that V1 might not be necessary for visual conscious
experience (Barbur et al., 1993; Crick and Koch, 1995) but fur-
ther research and theoretical positions generally favored the idea
that cortical feedback to V1 is indeed necessary for visual con-
scious perception and therefore part of the NCC (Lamme, 2001;
Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001; Tong, 2003). We believe that the
division between the three types of NCC can be fruitful in solv-
ing such controversies, as it offers the possibility that although
V1 activity correlates with conscious perception (Tong, 2003), it
might constitute a NCC-pr rather than be a part of the NCC. Indeed,
a recent experiment revisited the issue whether patients with V1
lesion lack visual consciousness (Ffytche and Zeki, 2011) and con-
trary to what is commonly believed the authors showed that these
patients do have visual experiences. Furthermore, clinical studies
have shown that conscious vision can recover after a V1 lesion
(Silvanto and Rees, 2011). These results imply that neither activity
in V1 nor the cortical feedback to V1 is necessary for visual con-
scious perception. In the current terminology, intact V1 would be
an important prerequisite for visual conscious experience, but not
part of the NCC. However, it is possible that V1 is not necessary for
all visual experiences but those involving the ﬁne-tuned spatial con-
trast distribution in the experienced image due to the functional
capabilities of V1. Thus, whether some brain area is necessarily
involved in NCC may  depend not only on its neuroanatomical locus,
but also on the speciﬁc details of the experience (Haynes, 2009).
Taken  together, the tripartite distinction of NCCs calls for a reap-
praisal of previous results and theories, but also highlights the need
of further studies that put emphasis on investigating and distin-
guishing the pre-conscious determinants of conscious perception
(NCC-pr) and its consequences (NCC-co) from the NCC proper.
5.  Conclusions
Despite its original simplicity and appeal, the traditional
method, contrasting trials with and without conscious perception
of a particular target, by itself does not appear to have the neces-
sary speciﬁcity to reveal the NCC. Instead, processes that precede
(NCC-pr) and follow (NCC-co) conscious perception are confounded
with the NCC proper. Here we relied on the theoretical distinction
between those processes (Bachmann, 2009; de Graaf et al., 2012;
Melloni and Singer, 2010) and suggested tentative experimental
paradigms aimed at disentangling these processes from each other.
An important way  to circumvent the speciﬁcity problem alto-
gether is to move away from mere correlates and focus the search
on mechanisms of conscious experience, as correlates which do
not have explanatory power can be excluded a priori (Melloni
and Singer, 2010). However, the key to success in unraveling the
NCC will ultimately lie in combining such mechanistic models
that generate testable predictions (Bachmann, 2007; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011; Lamme, 2006; Melloni and Singer, 2010) with
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uitable experimental paradigms. Only then we will be capable of
utting theoretical proposals to the test. We  thus hope that future
ork, adopting the distinction between NCC, NCC-pr and NCC-co
nd following the empirical strategies proposed here, will allow
s to re-assess previous studies and theories, focus on the NCC,
nd distill the crucial neural processes that underlie our conscious
xperience.
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